The Truth About the 1973 Coup and the Role of the Christian Democratic Party
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Fifty-two years after the coup d’état of September 11, 1973, it is worth clarifying, in light of the facts, the role played by the Christian Democratic Party (Democracia Cristiana, hereafter DC) through the actions of its top leaders at the time. This clarification is particularly relevant now, as former president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle seeks to discredit his party’s national leadership for supporting the presidential candidacy of Jeanette Jara.
During Patricio Aylwin’s presidential campaign, which brought him to La Moneda in 1990, prominent politicians from the traditional left who had joined the DC in 1981 to end the dictatorship tried to absolve him of responsibility for the coup. They claimed that Aylwin and his comrades, at worst, had merely “supported” the overthrow of Chile’s constitutional president, Salvador Allende. The truth is otherwise.
The DC of today is not the DC of more than half a century ago. At that time, aligned with the right, the DC actively participated in planning and executing the 1973 coup. The party’s pro-coup faction, led by former presidents Eduardo Frei Montalva and Patricio Aylwin, along with Andrés Zaldívar, neutralized national leaders who opposed the military takeover—such as Radomiro Tomic, Renán Fuentealba, and Bernardo Leighton—starting in 1971. The first step was forming a coalition with the right, called the “Democratic Confederation” (CODE), aimed at constitutionally removing Allende.
This goal was feasible if CODE secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament through the March 1973 elections. The alliance with the right was politically motivated: as a larger party than the right-wing National Party, the DC expected to return to power following the legal removal of Allende’s socialist government. The assassination of former Interior Minister Edmundo Pérez Zujovic during Frei Montalva’s administration (1964–1970) facilitated this plan. Pérez was shot in Santiago months before Allende’s inauguration by the VOP (Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo), a tiny extraparliamentary ultra-leftist group with no connection to Allende’s government. Under Frei Montalva’s administration, the VOP was quickly dismantled.
When the legal removal of Allende failed, the DC, following its ideological platform promoting a “community society” and a “revolution in freedom,” should have naturally distanced itself from the right. Voices within the party advocated negotiating with Allende’s government, but Frei, Aylwin, and Zaldívar prevailed. The DC-right plan did not end with the electoral failure to remove Allende; political events then followed another path, as Clausewitz might observe. After the failed elections, the coup unfolded, executed by the Armed Forces under the ideological influence of the civilian right.
Two agreements existed between CODE and the military plotters. First, the military government would be temporary. Immediately following the coup, both the junta led by General Augusto Pinochet and CODE leaders promised the country that the military would return power swiftly. Second, the military would hand over government authority to then-Senate President Eduardo Frei Montalva, who would restore democratic rule after a short period. Demonstrating DC loyalty, Aylwin toured internationally distributing “The White Book of the Popular Unity,” a CODE publication.
All this occurred while torture and killings of women, men, and children took place in prisons, streets, and homes across Chile, widely known both domestically and internationally. At the same time, Aylwin publicly claimed that the firepower of Allende-supporting parties was “greater than that of the Armed Forces”—a statement that remains unparalleled in Chilean political history for its absurdity.
The right did not honor its commitments. DC spokesman Andrés Zaldívar was expelled from the country, while Frei and Aylwin had to remain silent, fearing for their lives. Dissident Christian Democrat Bernardo Leighton and his wife suffered a fatal attack in Italy, highlighting the coup’s brutal realities. Unlike Aylwin, Leighton exposed the true nature of the coup and systematic human rights violations abroad. Leighton’s activism prompted retaliatory measures, including the appalling disposal of professor Lumi Videla’s body at the Italian embassy in Santiago by Manuel Contreras, head of DINA, the dictatorship’s secret police.
Only after this betrayal did the DC change course—but by then it was too late. With its tacit support, Pinochet’s murderous fascist dictatorship took hold, aligned with U.S. geopolitical objectives.
The DC was part of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Cold War. Spanish social scientist Joan Garcés, in Soberanos e Intervenidos, reveals that Frei Montalva received $180,000 from the U.S. government from 1962, plus $50,000 for his party, according to the declassified U.S. document “Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973.” The CIA also financially supported Frei in the 1964 presidential election. Former U.S. ambassador Edward Korry testified that Frei expressed concern over a possible Allende victory, which Korry attempted to calm.
After Allende’s electoral victory in September 1970, Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider was assassinated by the far-right terrorist group Patria y Libertad. General Roberto Viaux, the primary planner, claimed he intended only to kidnap Schneider to provoke military opposition against the elected president. Various accounts implicate DC leader Frei Montalva in the operation. In an interview, Viaux claimed:
“I received a message from Mr. Nicolás Díaz Pacheco, sent by President Frei through the priest Mr. Ruiz-Tagle, Frei’s brother-in-law, telling me that I had ‘the green light to act’ (to kidnap Schneider), but that I should do it properly to ensure success; otherwise, I would be compelled to face repercussions.”
Whether Viaux fabricated this, it aligns with Frei’s contact with Korry and his frustration at Allende’s victory.
A decisive moment showing the DC’s coup commitment was its refusal to negotiate agreements over 91 publicly owned enterprises, which could have eased political tensions and supported democratic continuity. Allende repeatedly sought dialogue, but Frei, as Senate President, refused and instructed Aylwin to close all avenues for agreement. Allende formally appealed to Frei, but received no response.
On the morning of September 9, Allende informed Pinochet and Army Inspector General Orlando Urbina of his decision to hold a plebiscite to resolve the deadlock with the opposition. That afternoon, Pinochet and his allies decided to join the coup, precluding Allende’s democratic recourse.
After the coup, Frei visited the Military Junta to reaffirm DC support, as widespread persecution and massacres began. Frei Montalva’s opposition to Allende had been evident since 1970, including soliciting U.S. assistance to prevent Allende’s inauguration.
During the 1973 parliamentary elections, aiming for a two-thirds majority to remove the president, Frei was elected senator for Santiago and, with right-wing support, became Senate President. On July 6, 1973, he declared to business leaders at SOFOFA:
“Nothing I, Congress, or any civilian can do. Unfortunately, this problem can only be solved with rifles… I advise you to state your concerns plainly to the Armed Forces commanders, which I fully share.”
In his memoirs, Christian Democrat Gabriel Valdés recounts that Frei knew of a coup in advance and saw it as inevitable. On the morning of September 11, Frei called Pinochet three times, offering assistance, but the calls were redirected to subordinates.
By 1981, after DC’s failure to influence the dictatorship, Frei became the first major political figure opposing the regime. He died unexpectedly on January 22, 1982, at 71. Later investigations, including exhumations in 2006 and 2013, found chemical agents in his remains, and Chilean courts confirmed in 2017 and 2019 that Frei had been assassinated.
Today, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle attempts to pull the DC back to its past. As a young man, alongside his father, he was a loyal supporter of the 1973 coup and the dictatorship, and later refused to support his sister Carmen in clarifying their father’s assassination.
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