Extortion, hate crimes, the expansion of organized drug trafficking, and institutional weakening are hitting hard what was once considered the Switzerland of Central America—a nation that years ago abolished its army and promoted the slogan "More teachers than soldiers."

This landscape is confronting the new right-wing government of Laura Fernández, characterized as a direct continuation of her predecessor Rodrigo Chaves, whom she appointed as super-minister. A prominent element in her policy of alignment with the United States has been the severing of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Fernández's inaugural presidential speech echoed the same tone as Chaves, utilizing populist rhetoric in which "the people," "the street," and "the government of ordinary people" clash with "the elites" and the institutions underpinning Costa Rican democracy. This discourse contains the authoritarian strain that has characterized the political project, fitting the same mold as Nayib Bukele or Javier Milei—specifically the thesis that those from "before" failed.

A constant struggle persists with the Legislative Assembly, where the "continuity government" secured a plurality of seats but fell short of the numbers required for absolute changes. This legislative body remains the primary institutional dam retaining a democracy that historically faced few criticisms.

Fernández, inheriting the issues left by her predecessor, has acknowledged the failure of the State against organized crime in Costa Rica, which is currently operating even from within prisons.

At present, the administration's primary focus appears less directed at combating this criminality and more on removing magistrates accused of preparing a coup d'état against it. However, critics argue the underlying intent is to block investigations into unpunished corruption cases that could compromise the "super-minister."

The president also criticized what she described as an excessively rights-guaranteeing perspective within the judicial system, noting that in certain instances, the rights of criminals were prioritized while victims remained sidelined.

No Longer the Exception

Recent reports published by InSight Crime and analyses by Reuters demonstrate how Costa Rica has ceased to be viewed as a regional exception in terms of security, beginning instead to face criminal dynamics similar to other Latin American nations affected by transnational networks.

While the government considers it necessary to strengthen control mechanisms against criminal structures, legal sectors and human rights advocates may question proposals regarding visitation restrictions, mandatory recordings, and the expansion of state authority within the penitentiary system.

The issue is no longer limited strictly to apprehending criminals. The current debate centers on whether the Costa Rican State retains the institutional capacity to regain control over increasingly organized, technological, and violent criminal structures.

According to an analysis by Impacto Noticias CR, Costa Rica may soon enter one of its most complex debates in recent years: how to intensify the fight against organized crime without compromising the democratic and legal balance that historically distinguished the nation in Latin America.

However, the obstruction of corruption investigations—which for years has undermined the country's democratic image—presents a deeper concern. Today, the nation faces a growing perception that corruption is not an isolated issue, but a recurring phenomenon across various levels of the State.

The Economic Cost

Several major corruption scandals in Costa Rica have involved public works, state banking, and acquisitions during the pandemic, costing the State millions of dollars and eroding public trust in institutions.

In Costa Rica, discussing corruption is not merely a matter of ethics, but of financial impact.

Every act of corruption results in lost resources, inflated project costs, and missed opportunities. While a single exact figure is difficult to establish, various analyses agree that the overall impact represents billions in indirect losses.

This hidden cost translates into inferior public services, reduced foreign investment, and heightened fiscal pressure.

Corruption in Costa Rica manifests in sectors where public resources and decision-making authority intersect. Key areas include: public procurement (infrastructure projects and bids with overpricing risks); management of large budgets with imperfect controls; local permits, land use, and contracting; and political-corporate relations involving improper influence on state decisions. These scenarios concentrate risks due to discretion and a lack of effective oversight.

Understanding corruption in Costa Rica requires analyzing structural factors such as weak or slow controls, excessive bureaucracy that encourages shortcuts, a lack of effective accountability, political and economic interests, and in some cases, social tolerance that permits these practices to recur.

Prominent Cases

Over recent decades, several scandals have shaped public perception regarding corruption in Costa Rica, both for their political fallout and economic losses:

1. Banco Anglo (1994): The collapse of the state bank due to mismanagement and irregularities. Implicated: Financial officials and associated actors. Outcome: Legal proceedings without clear consequences across all levels. Estimated cost: Over $100 million.

2. ICE–Alcatel (2004): Payment of bribes to secure public contracts. Implicated: High-ranking officials, including former President Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. Outcome: First-instance convictions followed by subsequent judicial changes. Estimated cost: Over $2.4 billion in bribes.

3. CCSS–Fischel (2004): Irregularities in the purchase of medical equipment. Implicated: Including former President Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier. Outcome: Judicial conviction. Estimated cost: Approximately $9 million.

4. Yanber (2015–2017): Corporate crisis involving questionable credit lines. Implicated: Business executives and former officials. Outcome: Prolonged legal proceedings. Estimated cost: Nearly $20 million.

5. "El Cementazo" (2017): Irregular loans granted for cement importation. Implicated: Business figures, politicians, and judicial officials. Outcome: Complex and protracted investigations. Estimated cost: Over $30 million.

6. Bancrédito (2017): Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago was intervened and closed following a prolonged financial crisis marked by questioned decisions, accumulated losses, and management failures. Implicated: Bank authorities and political decision-makers. Outcome: No single flagship corruption trial, but widespread questioning of resource management. Estimated cost: Over $100 million in losses and state bailouts.

7. Cochinilla (2021): Corruption network in road infrastructure projects. Implicated: Public officials and construction firms. Outcome: Ongoing proceedings. Estimated cost: Tens of millions of dollars.

8. Diamante (2021): Investigation into alleged municipal corruption involving contract awards for public works and services. Implicated: Mayors, municipal staff, and contractors. Outcome: Ongoing judicial processes with multiple indictments and precautionary measures. Estimated cost: Millions of dollars in suspect contracts.

9. Pandemic Face Masks (2020–2021): Investigations into public acquisitions of face masks and medical equipment with alleged price, quality, and procurement irregularities. Implicated: Public officials and emergency vendors. Outcome: Administrative and judicial inquiries, some ongoing. Estimated cost: Millions of dollars in questioned purchases.

Structural Risk

Beyond individual scandals, these cases demonstrate that corruption in Costa Rica is structural rather than isolated, adapting over time across different institutional sectors from banking to infrastructure.

When corruption ceases to provoke public outrage, combating it becomes increasingly difficult. Social tolerance rises, public demand for accountability declines, and the issue shifts from an exception to an integrated aspect of daily operations.

Translated by Sergio A. Paneque Díaz / CubaSí Translation Staff